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Abstract
In this paper, we examine net investment during the early stages of transition using micro data on
the population of medium and large industrial firms in the Czech Republic during the 1992-95
period. We examine the relevance of alternative models of investment and test if investment
behavior varies across categories of ownership and with the legal status of firms. Our analysis of
depreciation leads us to the conclusion that replacement investment displays a similar pattern in
many ownership-legal form categories of firms. Retained profit is found to be a major determinant
of new investment and the estimate is statistically significant even when we use the most robust
fixed effects estimates based on one-year differences. We find that enterprise profitability has a
strong positive effect on investment in all types of firms except for privately owned-limited liability
companies and foreign owned and mixed ownership firms. These results are consistent with the
financing-hierarchy and credit-rationing hypotheses which indicate that domestic firms cannot easily
borrow investment funds externally and that net investment varies with retained profits. Firms take
into account various stock measures of internal finance. In particular, a stock of cash, receivables,
receivables overdue, payables, and payables overdue systematically affect net investment.
Abstrakt
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1) See e.g., Jorgenson (1971), Nickell (1977), Abel (1980), Abel and Blanchard (1986),
Shapiro (1986), Fazzari et al. (1988), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Blanchard et al. (1990),
and Bond and Meghir (1994).
2) See e.g., Thornton (1970), Desai (1976), Gomulka (1978, 1986), Greene and Levine
(1976), Weitzman (1979), Brada and Hoffman (1985), and Terrell (1992, 1993).
3) See e.g., Belka et al. (1994), EBRD (1995) and Eickelpasch (1995).
1. Introduction
Since investment determines the quantity and quality of one of the two most
important factors of production and greatly affects macroeconomic activity, studies of
investment behavior have always occupied a pivotal place in western economics. On the
demand side, much of the literature has focused on establishing the relative merits of the
Tobin Q, neoclassical and accelerator models of investment demand. For the most part,
the literature has assumed that the supply of investment finance is perfectly elastic. In
recent years, part of the literature has concentrated on the supply side, examining the
effects of potential market imperfections on the supply of capital to different types of firms.
1)
In view of Stalin’s and other communist leaders’ preoccupation with overtaking
capitalist economies by carrying out massive capital formation, studies of investment also
constituted a key area of comparative economics.
2) The centrally planned economies
(CPEs) indeed reported very high rates of investment during most of their existence,
although these rates declined somewhat in the 1980s as the growth of these economies
slowed down and popular demand for consumption goods became harder to ignore
(EBRD, 1995). The high pre-1980s investment rates in CPEs also generated large stocks
of capital whose vintage became gradually older in the 1980s. Finally, the CPEs
increasingly lagged in terms of technical progress, and the COCOM embargo, imposed in
the 1980s by western countries on advanced technology exports to the CPEs, further
hampered the ability of these economies to reduce the rate of growth of their comparative
technological obsolescence.
As the transition from central planning to a market system started to unfold in the
1990s, it became clear that the transition economies needed to invest heavily in order to
modernize their obsolete capital stock and become competitive on world markets. The
issue of how best to restructure and modernize the state-owned firms has been the focal
point of a major policy debate about what constitutes an optimal type of ownership and
legal form in these new market economies. Interestingly, while a small number of studies
provided valuable partial surveys of investment in the transition economies,
3) detailed© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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analytical studies of the investment behavior of firms in these economies are just now
being performed.
In this paper, we carry out an in-depth analytical study of investment behavior using
data from most industrial firms located in the Czech Republic during the 1992-95 period.
The Czech Republic is one of the pioneering transition countries, having carried out the
most widespread privatization and commercialization of firms, attracting significant foreign
direct investment, and maintaining relatively high rates of investment in general. Our study
is therefore of interest because it analyzes investment behavior in one of the leading
transition economies that serves as a model for the countries that launched their transitions
later.
While our study is naturally of interest to the analysts, policy makers and observers
of the transition process, the fact that we are able to use a very large panel of quarterly
firm-level data makes our work relevant in the context of the recent investment literature
in general. In particular, by using micro panel data we are able to eliminate bias introduced
by aggregation (see e.g., Abel and Blanchard,1986), reduce measurement error, and take
into account heterogeneity across firms and over time (see e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994).
Unlike in many western studies, we are fortunate to have data on both depreciation
and net investment. Our empirical strategy has therefore been to examine the behavior of
these two components of gross investment separately. Since our results about the
behavior of depreciation parallel the earlier findings of Lizal (1999a), in this study we
extend this work but focus primarily on the behavior of net investment. Moreover, since the
issues of (a) the degree of imperfection of capital markets and (b) the relationship between
enterprise ownership and investment (strategic restructuring) are key issues in the
transition literature, we examine the relationship between net investment and the
availability of internal finance using data from thirteen principal ownership-legal form
categories of firms.
The switch from central planning to a transition period forced firms that traditionally
received centrally-allocated investment funds to face the emerging commercial banks and
other financial institutions. Operating in a highly protected and concentrated environment,
the new commercial banks usually imposed high spreads between deposit and lending
rates in order to increase their low initial capitalization. They also had to develop their
project appraisal capability from scratch and establish international accounting standards.
In this context, it is likely that many of the new and existing firms faced expensive external
finance for investment or were denied such finance. The data from transition economies© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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4) See Fazzari et al. (1988) and Gertler (1988) for overviews of this literature.
5) As Lizal and Svejnar (1998) show, there is some support for neoclassical models in the
behavior of gross investment. In future research it will also be useful to examine the
possibility of estimating dynamic structural models of investment in more detail. However,
as Lizal (1999b) shows, in the Czech case the parameters from these models imply
unrealistic beliefs about the long-term sustainability of soft budget macroeconomic policies.
6) The source is CESTAT, various issues.
hence lend themselves to testing the financing hierarchy and credit rationing hypotheses
advanced in western literature.
4)
In this paper we present estimates of the financing hierarchy (credit rationing)
models of net investment. Our focus on these supply side models is given by the fact that
there are strong beliefs among observers of transition economies that capital markets are
highly imperfect and that verifying the extent of this phenomenon is an important task for
empirical research. Moreover, our pre-tests reveal that models that stem from  neoclassical
literature do not receive much support from the net investment data.
5)
2. The Data and Basic Statistics
2a. Comparative Macroeconomic Indicators
Since 1991, the national statistical offices of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia have been collecting comparable data on major macroeconomic indicators.
In Table 1, we present aggregate time series data from this source on GDP, gross
investment, and the investment/GDP ratio for these four economies.
6) The corresponding
plots of the investment/GDP ratio are shown in Figure 1.
The data in Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal two striking features: a) the Czech and
Slovak Republics have since 1991 uniformly invested a higher proportion of GDP than
Hungary and Poland, and b) the investment behavior displays a very strong and regular
seasonal character in all four economies.
With respect to rates of investment across the four economies, the investment/GDP
ratio in the Czech Republic averaged 30% and fluctuated in the 14-54% range, between
1991 and the fourth quarter of 1996. In Slovakia, the ratio averaged 32%, with a range of
16-67%. In Hungary, investment/GDP attained an average of 19% and moved between 9%
and 32%. Finally, in Poland the investment/GDP ratio averaged a mere 10%, with a range
of 5-19%.© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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7) These checks are similar to Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (1995). Namely, the firm’s capital
at the start and end of each quarter should be positive; the average labor force in a given
The question that naturally arises is why do the four Central European countries
display such different propensities to invest. In the case of Poland, the data cover only
larger firms (those with more than 50 workers in industry and 20 workers elsewhere). It is
hence possible that the low investment figures for Poland are brought about by this
omission of smaller firms. As Gomulka and Jasinski (1994) have shown, the small private
firms accounted for most of the growth in the Polish economy in the early 1990s and they
are therefore likely to have invested significantly in order to produce this growth. In the
Czech Republic, unlike the other three countries, the investment data exclude intangible
assets. Consequently, the Czech investment/GDP ratio would be even higher if this type
of investment were included. The greatest puzzle is perhaps Hungary, which is reported
by the World Bank (1996) to have received $10.6 billion in foreign direct investment
(equivalent to 31% of its 1994 GDP) between 1989 and 1995. In contrast, in the same
period the Czech Republic, with a similar population, received only $4 billion (13% of its
1994 GDP), Poland $6.5 billion (7% of its 1994 GDP), and Slovakia $0.5 billion (4% of its
1994 GDP). Hungary’s domestic investment is hence particularly low compared to the other
three countries.
One striking aspect of the seasonal pattern is the finding that investment rises
continuously from the first to the fourth quarter and in the fourth quarter, it is almost twice
as high as in the second and third quarters. The pattern is most clearly visible in the Czech
and Slovak data, but it exists in the investment series of all four countries. As we will
presently show, the same seasonal pattern is visible in the Czech firm-level data.
2b. The Czech Enterprise-level Data
The principal data set that we use in the present analysis was collected by the
Czech Statistical Office (CSO) and covers all industrial firms employing more than 25
people in the 1992-94 period and more than 100 employees in 1995. The data were
collected in quarterly or monthly intervals, depending on the size of the enterprise and the
reported variables. We have combined the monthly and quarterly data so as to maximize
the sample size. In some parts of our analysis, we also treat the 1995 data separately
because of the change in the composition of firms.
While the CSO was careful in collecting the data, the data set contains a number
of errors and inconsistencies. Moreover, when coding data the CSO does not distinguish
between missing values and zeroes. In an attempt to assemble a reliable data set
(approximately 50,700 quarterly observations), we have used various consistency checks.
7)© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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quarter should be more than 20 employees; investment should be non-negative; production
should be positive; depreciation should be positive and less than the total capital value;
investment should be smaller than end of the period capital stock; the average wage
should be higher than 2000Kc/month (minimum wage); sales should be non-negative; one-
year lagged production, sales and labor should be non-negative or missing.
8) One large firm that met the nine criteria reported a 90 percent drop in output during the
third quarter of 1993. This deviation affected the summary statistics (see e.g., the large
standard deviation in 1993:Q3 investment/production in Table 3) and some regression
estimates. We have therefore eliminated this observation from the data set. Finally, data
on capital stock are unavailable for 1992 and we hence use 1992 data for analyses that
do not involve the capital stock variable.
In imposing these consistency criteria, about 10% of the observations had to be
dropped, leaving us with a sample comprised of about 90 percent of all industrial firms in
the Czech Republic.
8) In terms of total number of firms (quarterly observations), our data
set covers 2860 firms (2252-2738 quarterly observations) in 1992, 3231 firms (2657-3009
quarterly observations) in 1993, 4133 firms (3503-3867 quarterly observations) in 1994,
and 2271 firms (2205-2261 quarterly observations) in 1995. The decline in the number of
firms and quarterly observations between 1994 and 1995 was brought about by a CSO
switch from covering firms with 25 or more employees to 100 or more employees. A
detailed description of the data is provided in the Appendix.
As may be seen from Table 2, our data set contains detailed information about the
ownership and legal form of the firms. The ownership categories reflect majority ownership
of the firm (e.g., a firm is classified as privately owned if it is more than fifty percent
privately owned). When the private owners, cooperative members, state, or foreign owners
do not own a majority stake in the firm, the firm is classified as having mixed ownership.
The ownership categorization was carried out by the CSO after two massive waves of
privatization in 1992 and 1993. Since the mass privatization of 1992-93 constitutes the
principal reallocation of majority ownership stakes, there is little variation in the ownership
of any given firm during our 1992-95 sample period.
The legal form denotes the type of legal registration of the firm and reflects the legal
obligations and liabilities associated with each form of registration. It also captures the
relative financial and bureaucratic ease of establishing a given type of firm. Thus, individual
(family), cooperative, and limited liability categories tend to capture smaller firms that were
started with a relatively low initial capital base. In contrast, joint stock companies tend to
be larger in size. The exceptions to this rule are the state owned and mixed ownership
firms, each of which has a similar average firm size in both the limited liability and joint© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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stock legal form. Finally, state owned-state registered firms tend to be relatively small,
averaging less than one-half of the employees of other state owned firms.
From Table 2 it is clear that the most important ownership-legal form categories are
privately owned-limited liability companies (13,927 quarterly observations) and state
owned-joint stock companies (11,475 quarterly observations). These are followed by state
owned-state registered enterprises (6,835 quarterly observations), cooperatively owned-
rural cooperatives (3,063 observations), privately owned-joint stock companies (2,480
observations), foreign owned-limited liability companies (2,091 observations), privately
owned-individual/family businesses (1,845 observations), mixed ownership-joint stock
companies (766 observations), foreign owned-joint stock companies (707 observations),
cooperatively owned-producer cooperatives (587 observations), state owned-limited liability
companies (441 observations), and mixed ownership-limited liability firms (298
observations). These twelve categories plus the remaining "other" firms category constitute
the thirteen categories that we analyze in this paper.
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 give the evolution over time of the number of
observations in the legal form and ownership categories, respectively. As may be seen
from Table A1, between 1992 and 1994, joint stock companies maintained their share in
the total number of observations at around 30% but their share jumped to 46% when only
firms with 100 or more employees were considered. The share of limited liability companies
rose from 27% in 1992 to 47% in 1994 and then dropped to 36% in 1995 when only firms
with 100 or more employees were included. The share of firms registered as having state
owned enterprise legal form declined from 25% to 6% and those registered as
individual/family (entrepreneur) legal form remained at about 4% in the 1992-94 period.
However, they dropped under 2% when only larger firms were covered in 1995. In terms
of ownership (Table A2), the share of privately owned firms rose from 31% in 1992 to 51%
in 1994 and then receded to 41% in the larger firm sample in 1995. The share of state
owned firms declined from 53% in 1992 to 31% in 1994, but then rose to 41% in 1995.
Between 1992 and 1995, the cooperatively owned firms’ share decreased from 10% to 7%,
while that of foreign owned firms jumped from 4% to 8%, and that of mixed companies rose
from 2% to 4%. Overall, while the trend has not been monotonic in all cases, since 1992
there has been a definite increase in the share of domestic private, foreign and mixed
ownership, together with the limited liability legal form.
Table A3 in the Appendix gives the distribution of observations across industries.
The distribution of firms across industries is quite broad with the largest share of firms
(16%) in the food industry, 13% in the machinery industry, 11% in the metal product
industry, 7% in both the processing of non-metallic minerals and the furniture industry, and
6% in the textile industry. Each of the remaining industry groups has under 5% of all firms.© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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The summary statistics of variables that are relevant to our analysis are presented
in Table 3. As may be seen from the table, while both net investment and depreciation
show the seasonal pattern with a fourth quarter peak that was observed in the aggregate
data, the pattern is much more pronounced in net investment than in depreciation. Profit
is relatively steady across all quarters in 1992 but shows a strong downward trend across
quarters in 1993, 1994 and 1995. In 1993 and 1995 profit reaches negative values in the
last quarter and shows relatively low overall levels in comparison to 1992 and 1994. The
elimination of the small firms from the data set between 1994 and 1995 means that the
average size of the labor force and capital stock increase dramatically between the last
quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 1995.
In order to start understanding the micro foundations of the cyclicality of aggregate
gross investment, characterized by the peak in the fourth quarter of each year (Tables 1
and 3), we examine the behavior of net investment as well as depreciation in each of the
thirteen categories of firms. In Table 4, we present the quarterly evolution of the ratio of net
investment to total production for each of the thirteen principal ownership-legal form
categories of firms. As can be seen from the table, the aggregate cyclical nature of the
gross investment behavior is reflected regularly in the net investment behavior of state
owned-joint stock companies, foreign owned-joint stock companies, and mixed ownership-
joint stock companies. In three out of the four years, this behavior is also detected in
private-joint stock companies, state owned-state registered firms and foreign owned-limited
liability companies. Finally, cooperatives, state owned-limited liability companies, mixed
ownership-limited liability companies and other firms display this pattern in two of the four
years. In sum, the strong aggregate seasonal pattern of gross investment is reflected
primarily in the net investment behavior of joint stock companies of all ownership types,
and to a lesser extent in the net investment pattern of state owned-state registered and
foreign owned-limited liability firms. Privately owned-individual (family) businesses and
limited liability companies show this pattern in only one of the four years.
In examining the behavior of the ratio of depreciation to production in the various
types of firms, we find virtually no reflection of the aggregate cyclical pattern in gross
investment (Table 5). The quarterly depreciation/production data of the various types of
firms vary but do not display the strong upward trend with a peak in the fourth quarter. At
the level of the specific categories of firms, the seasonal behavior of the aggregate gross
investment/GDP is hence primarily accounted for by the pattern of net investment
described earlier.
Finally, in Table 6 we present calculations of the ratio of net investment plus
depreciation to depreciation for each type of firm. Examining this ratio is useful because
values of less than unity identify firms that are not replacing existing capital stock, while© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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9) See Dyba and Svejnar (1995).
Di,t ' "%*Ki,t%gi,t , (1)
values significantly in excess of unity indicate that firms are substantially increasing their
capital stock. As may be seen from the table, the most substantial investors by this criterion
have been foreign owned and privately owned limited liability companies, followed by
privately owned individual businesses, privately owned and foreign owned joint stock
companies and mixed ownership companies. State owned firms and cooperatives have
been investing relatively little, with state owned-limited liability companies investing less
than depreciation in 1992. Finally, it is worth noting that privately owned individual and
limited liability firms have shown a declining tendency to invest between 1992 and 1995.
This reflects the fact that these firms started growing from a low capital base but possibly
also the fact that, after massive bank lending to new private firms in the early phase of the
transition,
9) these firms gradually had less access to bank capital.
3. Econometric Models and Evidence
In our empirical analysis, we estimate separate equations for depreciation and net
investment in order to establish the behavioral patterns of each of these two components
of gross investment. All equations are estimated by ordinary least squares. In future
research it would be useful to explore the availability of instrumental variables to correct
for possible endogeneity of regressors.
3a. Depreciation
Czech laws and regulations permit firms to carry out straight-line depreciation of
book value capital up to upper limits that are defined for various categories of capital
goods. From the profit tax standpoint, depreciation is treated as a cost of production. In our
analysis, we provide estimates of the share of book value capital that depreciation
accounts for in the different types of firms. In particular, since depreciation does not display
strong seasonal patterns (Table 3), we start by estimating the following linear depreciation
equation:
where D denotes the quarterly value of depreciation, K the book value of capital and   the
depreciation rate. We have included a constant term which allows more flexibility since we
might always view this specification as a first approximation of a depreciation process( see
Lizal, 1999a).© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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The coefficient estimates of equation (1), covering the 1993-5 period for which
capital data are available, are presented in Table 7 for the sample as a whole and Table
8 for each category of firms. Coefficient of interest   is reported as a quarterly percentage
rate. As the F-test statistics below the two tables indicate, the specification with a single
intercept and single slope coefficient is preferable to specifications in which these vary by
industry. Moreover, Hausman test statistics below the two tables indicate that the fixed
effects specification is superior to the corresponding random effects model at a 1 percent
significance test level. We hence use the results from the parsimonious specification and
fixed effect (within) method of estimation. (The OLS, between and random effects
estimates, are reported for comparison).
The overall estimated rate of depreciation is estimated to be about 1 percent of the
capital stock per quarter or 4 percent at the annual rate (Table 7). Since the legally
permissible depreciation rate varies from 2 to 20 percent per year, depending on the type
of capital, our results indicate that the firms’ capital stock tends to be dominated by low
depreciation capital such as buildings.
In Table 8, we present estimates of the depreciation rate by firm type. The 1.74
percent coefficient of quarterly depreciation for the state owned and registered firms
represents the base to which the coefficients for other types of firms are related. The
coefficients for other types of firms hence indicate the deviation from the 1.74 coefficient
of the state owned and registered firms. As may be seen from the table, one cannot reject
the hypothesis that the 1.74 percent quarterly depreciation rate found for state owned and
registered firms also reflects the depreciation rate of privately owned individual businesses,
cooperatives, foreign owned-joint stock companies, and mixed ownership-limited liability
companies. The estimate of quarterly depreciation rate for foreign owned-limited liability
companies are almost twice as high, while estimates for private and state owned-joint stock
companies are about one-third less than the base rate of 1.74. The state owned-limited
liability companies generate a -1.43 fixed effects estimate which implies a very low rate of
depreciation for these firms. This estimated coefficient is also out of line with the OLS,
between and random effects estimates reported in Table 8. Given the implausibly low value
and the difference in comparison with the other estimates, the state owned-limited liability
estimate needs to be treated with caution.
The different estimated depreciation rates across categories of firms raises the
question of whether they are brought about by the particular type of investment carried out
recently by the different types of firms or whether they are due to a systematic change of
ownership and legal form in firms with certain capital stock during the transition. In order
to check which hypothesis receives more support, we have estimated equation (1) on data
for 1993 and 1995, respectively. The 1993 capital data by and large reflect the capital© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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10) In the first phase of the transition, western banks opened branches and subsidiaries
in the transition economies primarily to serve the foreign firms, many of which had been
their established clients.
11) We have also tested the validity of the neoclassical/accelerator models of investment
by including an output sales variable as a regressor. The estimated coefficient on this
variable was usually insignificant and occasionally had a negative rather than positive sign.
stock inherited from the period of central planning, while the 1995 capital data are already
much more influenced by the investment activity undertaken by firms since their
commercialization and ownership changes in the early 1990s. The results (not reported
here in a tabular form) indicate that the depreciation rate of companies with foreign
ownership grows more than that of other types of firms over time. This suggests that
depreciation is generally rising because of new investment but that (foreign) ownership
plays a part as well.
3b. Net Investment
In the Czech Republic, net investment is legally not a cost of production. Net
investment hence reflects the firm’s desire to invest out of taxable retained earnings or
funds obtained from government subsidies, bank loans, company bond issues, or equity
issues. As we mentioned earlier, the transition has brought about a significant reduction
of government subsidies to firms, while capital markets have been developing only very
gradually. It is therefore likely that the availability of internal funds has had a significant
impact on investment behavior of some types of firms. In particular, we hypothesize that
the individually owned or limited liability companies, which tend to be small, will be more
rationed in the capital market than the joint stock companies that tend to be large, or the
foreign firms that can supply themselves with investment finance from other countries.
10)
We therefore estimate models that link net investment to factors such as the availability
of internal finance within the firm which permit us to test this hypothesis (see e.g., Fazzari
et al.,1988, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992, and van Ees and Garretsen, 1994).
11)
Investment and Profit
Since our data set contains information on profit for most firms for most of the time
periods, we first examine the link of investment to this variable. This corresponds to the use
of the cash flow variable (profit plus depreciation) in the Western studies, except that we
are able to analyze depreciation separately and hence use net rather than gross
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explanatory variable. We estimate two models that link each type of firm’s quarterly net
investment to the present and past values of its profit.
In the first model we explicitly take into account the strong seasonal component
found in the quarterly data and estimate the equation in the four-quarter difference form,
thus controlling for the seasonality as well as other firm-specific fixed effects. During some
of the quarters we are missing either profit or net investment data for some of the firms,
and the data set on which we run the net investment equation is hence smaller (by almost
one-half) than the original data set. In order to control for possible selection bias in this
process, we first run a Heckman-type probit equation, predicting the probability of the firm
being included in the sample on the basis of data on investment, profit, industry and firm
type. The resulting inverse Mills ratio is included as an explanatory variable in the four-
quarter difference investment equation. The estimating equation is hence of the form
where I
net denotes net investment, A gross profit, and M the inverse Mills ratio from the
probit estimation. In order to assess the seasonal and industry effects, we use the
Anderson-Hsiao decomposition of the residuals generated by a level version of equation
(2), using the estimated (within) coefficients from (2). These level residuals are regressed
on quarterly and industry dummy variables.
The estimates of equation (2), together with an analysis of implied residuals, are
presented in Table 9. The reported specification is based on current and one quarter
lagged profit since longer lags proved to be mostly insignificant and their inclusion did not
materially alter the results. As may be seen from the first column, the overall regression
that constrains the coefficients to be identical for all types of firms indicates that there is
a statistically very strong positive relationship between profit and investment, with a one
crown increase in profit resulting in a 0.1 crown instantaneous and 0.12 crown long term
increase in investment.
The estimates by type of firm are presented in columns 2-13 of Table 9. As may be
seen from these columns, enterprise profitability has a strong positive effect on investment
in all types of firms except for privately owned-limited liability companies and foreign owned
and mixed ownership firms. The result for foreign owned and mixed firms is consistent with
the financing hierarchy and credit rationing hypotheses. In the case of privately owned-
limited liability companies the finding is a bit counterintuitive. It must be noticed, however,
that these three types of firms displayed a major decrease in profits in 1993 and to some
extent also in 1995 (Table A4-A7). It is therefore possible that the lack of a positive
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conjecture that we explore below. The inverse Mills ratio was always insignificant on one
per cent level of significance, and only once significant on the ten per cent level for the
state owned-joint stock type (which probably causes the same significance for the overall
regression). Such a result indicates that the sample selection problem is minimal even in
the most problematic case.
The second stage analysis of the residuals of equation (2), presented in the lower
part of Table 9, indicates that there is a strong seasonal pattern in the overall regression.
In particular, the coefficients on quarterly dummies imply a rising investment pattern over
the four quarters with a strong increase in the fourth quarter. From the regressions run by
firm type, we see that this overall pattern is driven by investment behavior of state owned
companies that are state registered or joint stock, as well as by foreign owned-limited
liability companies, coops, and to a lesser extent private joint stock companies. These
findings are consistent with the summary statistics examined earlier.
The second model that we estimate uses current and lagged quarterly values of
variables in levels rather than four-quarter differences:
Not requiring a four-quarter lag, this model allows us to use all the data more effectively.
Most importantly, it allows us to estimate a richer specification for the four quarters of 1994,
a period for which we have data on more variables. The estimates of equation (3) are
reported in Table 10. The results are based on a random effects specification which was
found to be better supported by the data than a quarter-to-quarter fixed effects model.
As can be seen from Table 10, the overall specification that constrains the
coefficients to be the same for all types of firms during the entire 1992-95 period yields a
0.094 coefficient on current quarter profit and a 0.034 coefficient on lagged profit. These
coefficients are similar to those observed in Table 9, suggesting that the less data-intensive
second model is able to capture the systematic features of investment behavior. As in
Table 9, the estimates for the thirteen specific types of firms reported in Table 10 indicate
that the firms that do not reflect the overall pattern are private-limited liability companies
and mixed ownership companies. Unlike in Table 9, privately owned-limited liability
companies as well as foreign owned companies display an insignificant effect of profit on
net investment. Finally, "other firms" are also found to have a negative relationship
between investment and profit. The two specifications hence produce identical overall
estimates but somewhat different estimates across the thirteen groups of firms.
As mentioned earlier, profitability of firms varied over the 1992-95 period and the
composition of the sample changed from 1994 to 1995. It is hence worth exploring if the© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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12) The privately owned-individual businesses have a pattern that is unrelated to the
behavior of average profit over time. They register a negative effect in 1992 (a profitable
year)  and a positive effect in 1993-95, despite the fact that their average profit in 1993-94
was similar to that in 1992, but became negative in 1995. The privately owned-limited
liability firms show no effect in 1992 and 1994, when their average profit was relatively
high, but they register a small positive effect in 1993 (a low profit year) and a small
negative effect in 1995 (a high profit year). The foreign owned-joint stock firms show a
positive effect in each year despite major fluctuations (including negative values) in
average profit. Mixed ownership-joint stock companies have a positive effect in 1992, zero
effect in 1993-94 and a negative effect in 1995. Mixed ownership-limited liability companies
have a zero effect in 1992-93 and a positive effect in 1994-95.
estimates vary over time. In the lower parts of Table 10, we present separate estimates of
equation (3) for each year. As the overall estimates in the first column indicate, there is
indeed a sizable variation of the estimated effect of profit on net investment over the four
years. While the overall long term effect is positive in all years, it is strong in 1992 and
1994, when reported enterprise profits were high, and much weaker in 1993 and 1995,
when profits were on average lower. In particular, the short (long) term effect is estimated
to be 0.25 (0.13) in 1992, -0.01 (0.07) in 1993, 0.36 (0.36) in 1994, and -0.01 (0.07) in
1995. The estimates for individual types of firms vary, but for a number of them the results
are consistent with this overall pattern. Thus, state owned and registered firms have a
strong positive effect in 1992 when their average profits were high, zero effect in 1993
when their average profits declined, and a small positive effect in 1994 and 1995 when
their profit was low. Private joint stock companies register a strong positive effect in 1992
and 1994, when their profits were high, and smaller effects in the low profit years of 1993
and 1995. Foreign owned-limited liability companies produce a positive effect in 1992 when
their average profit was moderately positive, a strongly negative effect in 1993 when the
average profit became negative, a very strong positive effect in 1994 when average profit
increased, and a positive (though less pronounced) effect in 1995 when their average profit
(as well as its standard deviation) soared. The other types of firms display more diverse
or less systematic patterns.
12)
Stock and Flow Measures of Internal Finance
For 1994 (a relatively high profit year for most types of firms) we have data on a
number of additional variables that capture potential sources of funds for firms in the
transition setting. In particular, we have data on receivables, receivables overdue,
payables, payables overdue, and cash balances. These variables correspond to the stock
measures of internal finance used in some of the western studies (e.g., Fazzari et al.,© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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1988, Galeotti et al., 1994, Hubbard et al., 1995, or Whited, 1992). The overall results
presented in the first column of Table 11 indicate that when these variables are included
in the regression, profit continues to have a strong positive effect with an estimated
coefficient of 0.34. Cash has an identical positive coefficient of 0.34, suggesting that it is
an important determinant of investment behavior. The coefficients on the other variables
are quantitatively smaller and reflect the ambiguous behavior of transition firms with
respect to legal obligations. Receivables have a positive coefficient of 0.04, reflecting the
fact that they represent a near term source of cash that may however be expected with
less than certainty. Receivables overdue in turn have a negative coefficient of -0.08, which
is consistent with the idea that these funds are unlikely to be repaid and are thus heavily
discounted. Payables have an expected negative (but low) coefficient of -0.01, but
payables overdue generate a positive coefficient of 0.03, likely reflecting the fact that some
of these may never have to pay.
At the level of individual categories of firms, profit has a particularly strong effect on
net investment among state owned-joint stock companies, foreign owned-limited liability
companies, mixed ownership-limited liability companies, other firms, and to a lesser extent
privately owned-joint stock companies. Cash has a strong positive effect in foreign owned-
limited liability companies, mixed ownership-joint stock companies and cooperatives. It has
a surprisingly negative effect in state and foreign owned joint stock companies. The latter
two sets of companies appear to hold cash balances that are negatively related to their
investment behavior. The investment behavior of foreign owned companies, mixed
ownership-joint stock companies, and to a lesser extent state owned-joint stock companies
is strongly influenced by the value of receivables and receivables overdue. Foreign owned-
joint stock companies, state owned-joint stock companies, and to a lesser extent foreign
owned-limited liability companies and mixed ownership-joint stock companies also
generate significant coefficients on payables and payables overdue.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this study we have used firm-level data from the Czech Republic to estimate
several specifications of depreciation and net investment functions, taking into account firm
ownership and the seasonality of the data.
Our analysis of depreciation leads us to the conclusion that replacement investment
displays a similar pattern in many ownership-legal form categories of firms. Important
exceptions are foreign owned-limited liability companies, whose depreciation rate is almost
twice as high, and private and state owned-joint stock companies, whose depreciation rate© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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is about one-third less than the base rate of 1.74. These results reflect the findings of Lizal
(1999a) who claims the major differences are associated with the type of industry.
Our analysis of net investment yields two major findings. First, retained profit is
found to be a major determinant of new investment and the estimate is statistically
significant even when we use the most robust fixed effects (within) estimates based on
one-year differences. Our results indicate that a one crown increase in profit results in a
0.1 crown instantaneous and 0.12 crown long-term increase in investment. In estimating
this effect by type of firm, we find that enterprise profitability has a strong positive effect on
investment in all types of firms except for privately owned-limited liability companies and
foreign owned and mixed ownership firms. All the results, except for the one related to
privately owned-limited liability companies are consistent with the financing hierarchy and
credit rationing hypotheses which indicate that domestic firms cannot easily borrow
investment funds externally and that investment varies with (is financed from) retained
profits. In the case of privately owned-limited liability companies the finding is a bit
counterintuitive because one might expect these firms to be particularly rationed in the
capital market. A possible explanation of the insignificant effect of profit on net investment
in these firms is that many of these firms operate close to the zero profit level and a
number of them may not be expanding beyond their existing scale.
Our second finding is that firms take into account various stock (as opposed to only
flow) measures of internal finance in making investment decisions. In particular, a firm’s
stock of cash, receivables, receivables overdue, payables, and payables overdue
systematically affect their net investments.© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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Table 1  Macroeconomic Indicators
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
Date I I/GDP I I/GDP I I/GDP I I/GDP
1991 154.4 0.22 491.9 0.21 12.3 0.15 69.8 0.25
1992/1 28.1 0.14 80.9 0.11 2.3 0.08 16.3 0.22
1992/2 39.8 0.20 129.1 0.18 2.9 0.10 20.3 0.27
1992/3 40.8 0.20 159.4 0.22 2.7 0.09 20.3 0.27
1992/4 92.2 0.46 186.2 0.26 5.4 0.19 34.2 0.45
1993/1 33.3 0.15 78.1 0.09 2.0 0.05 15.2 0.16
1993/2 58.4 0.26 140.1 0.16 3.3 0.08 22.7 0.25
1993/3 64.2 0.28 202.8 0.23 3.4 0.09 27.0 0.29
1993/4 100.2 0.44 204.0 0.23 5.1 0.13 40.1 0.43
1994/1 40.0 0.15 109.3 0.10 2.9 0.06 20.4 0.18
1994/2 70.7 0.27 171.6 0.16 4.0 0.08 26.6 0.24
1994/3 81.4 0.31 234.2 0.21 4.5 0.09 29.4 0.27
1994/4 126.7 0.49 337.8 0.31 8.0 0.15 48.4 0.44
1995/1 55.3 0.18 139.4 0.10 4.0 0.06 24.1 0.19
1995/2 91.5 0.30 230.8 0.17 5.9 0.08 35.8 0.28
1995/3 101.0 0.33 241.3 0.18 7.1 0.10 39.1 0.30
1995/4 163.3 0.54 391.5 0.29 11.9 0.17 63.8 0.49
1996/1 80.2 0.21 177.1 0.10 5.1 0.06 39.1 0.27
1996/2 133.4 0.35 268.5 0.16 8.9 0.10 55.1 0.38
1996/3 142.5 0.37 313.1 0.18 9.0 0.11 57.9 0.40
1996/4 202.8 0.53 578.9 0.34 17.4 0.19 90.2 0.63
1996 558.9 0.36 1337.6 0.20 41.3 0.11 242.3 0.42
Notes: All figures in billions of current (nominal) national currencies (Czech Crown, Slovak Crown, Polish Zloty, Hungarian Forint) as of 1997.
Source: CESTAT (former Statistical Bulletin of Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Slovak and then Slovenian Statistical Offices). All figures are
comparable since the same methodology is used. Czech and Slovak Republics use the European System of Accounts (ESA) methodology, while
Hungary and Poland use the System of National Accounts (SNA) methodology. Investment includes tangible and intangible fixed assets (with
the exception of the Czech Republic which includes only tangible fixed assets). With the exception of Poland, all investment data are for the whole
National Economy, including also estimates for entities not monitored by statistical offices. Poland investment reflects entities with more than 20
(50 for industry) employees.Tables and Figures - Page 2
Figure 1
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Note:
a The number of observations is the sum of all quarterly observations with non-missing values.
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Table 7  Estimated Depreciation Rate in % of Capital Stock
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Table 8 Estimated Depreciation Rate in % of Capital
















































































































































Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rsq. .864 .953 .899 .877
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Pred.Succ% 60.0 55.8 61.0 63.3 56.9 60.6 60.3 59.4 63.6 60.0 65.3 70.8 63.9
N. of Obs. 20491 2962 722 5073 1101 2120 246 6481 743 353 432 96 159
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Obs. 36814 5123 1502 11169 2052 3189 390 9975 1610 568 672 233 325















































































































































Obs. 6618 1593 290 1471 225 703 68 1860 178 80 86 23 38















































































FE vs. RE 0.741 0.611 0.346 0.236 0.466 0.274 0.574 0.952 0.212 0.912 0.258 0.000 0.337
1993
Obs. 9744 2068 490 2646 328 954 104 2476 332 115 120 49 59















































































































































Obs. 12299 1019 595 4653 716 956 119 2882 702 199 241 78 149















































































FE vs. RE 0.975 0.285 0.018 0.680 0.224 0.021 0.711 0.976 0.721 0.350 0.230 0.648 0.454
1995
Obs. 8153 443 137 2399 783 576 99 2757 398 174 225 83 79
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Table 11 Net Investment and Firm’s Financial Conditions - Random Effects Estimates, in Levels 1994






















Obs. 14170 1047 695 5729 851 988 126 3106 869 218 264 95 182























































































































































































FE vs. RE 0.122 0.477 0.956 0.008 0.979 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.958 0.006 0.074 0.240 0.026© Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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Table A1 Frequency Distribution of Firms by Legal Form
Legal  Form 1992 1993 1994 1995  Total
Entrepreneurship 4.23 4.92 4.80 1.59 4.06 
Ltd. 26.83 33.06 47.06 35.58 36.67 
Joint Stock Co. 31.99  28.95  31.50  46.17  33.88 
General  Coop 7.13 6.47 6.95 6.15 6.70 
Industry  Coop 2.64 2.36 0.05 0.36 1.28 
SOE 25.16  22.04 8.18 5.55  15.00 
State  Subsidized 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Other 1.90 2.11 1.46 4.60 2.36 
Observations 10257 11644 14706  9110 45717 © Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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Table A2 Frequency Distribution of Firms by Ownership
Ownership 1992 1993 1994  1995  Total
Private 31.11 37.40 50.63  40.85 40.93 
Cooperative 9.86 8.94 6.99  6.52 8.04 
State 52.62 46.53 31.10  41.11 41.85 
International/Foreign 4.19 4.88 7.91  7.48 6.12 
Mixed 1.65 1.74 2.53  3.70 2.36 
Other/Unknown 0.57 0.51 0.84  0.34 0.70 
Observations 10257 11644 14706 9110 45717 © Lubomír Lízal and Jan Svejnar, CERGE-EI
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Table A3 Frequency Distribution of Firms by Industry
Industry/NACE Observations Percent
Unknown 669 1.46 
Mining of Coal 220  0.48 
Mining of Oil and Gas 64  0.14 
Mining of Metal Ores 32  0.07 
Other Mining and Quarrying 701  1.53 
Food Production 7171  15.96 
Textile 2652 5.80 
Apparel Manufacturing 1773  3.88 
Leather and Footwear 1128  2.47 
Wood Production 1996  4.37 
Pulp and Paper 815  1.78 
Publishing and Printing 1371  3.00 
Chemicals 1124 2.46 
Rubber and Plastics 1308  2.86 
Non-metallic Minerals 3017 6.60 
Manufacture of Basic Metals 1186  2.59 
Fabricated Metal products except Machinery 4903  10.72 
Machinery 6103 13.35 
Office Machinery and Computers 92  0.20 
Electrical Apparatus 1783  3.90 
Radio and Television 698  1.53 
Medical and Precision Instruments 1043  2.28 
Motor Vehicles 805  1.76 
Other Transport Equipment 756  1.65 
Furniture 3213 7.03 
Recycling 336 0.73 
Water Utilities 755 1.65 
Other 3 0.00 
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Table A8 Gross Investment / Production by Type of Firm 1992-1995
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